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Abstract
We analyse a generalised form of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas predation model. In such a model
agents have a choice between productive work and appropriation. We suggest that such a model
can usefully be thought of as a continuous form of the Prisoners’ Dilemma. We present closed
form solutions for the interior equilibria and comparative statics for all Cournot equilibria and
analyse the social welfare losses arising from predation. We show that predation is minimised under
two quite different regimes, one in which claiming is very ineffective and another in which one of
the players becomes marginalised. The worst outcomes seem to arise when claiming is effective,
but inequality in power is significant but not extreme. This, arguably, is the situation in a number
of transition societies.
JEL Classification: C70, D23, D74
Keywords: conflict, predation, crime, Prisoners’ Dilemma, welfare loss
1. INTRODUCTION
Adam Smith is celebrated by modern economists as the inventor of the “invisible hand”
argument for the virtue of the free market. Agents acting independently of each other and
coordinating with each other only through the market mechanism manage to improve
the welfare of everyone. This at least is how the argument is generally understood.
Mittermaier (1999) has argued that the invisible hand argument is making a simpler
point aimed at a different problem: Smith was concerned to show that parasitic behaviour
was detrimental to general welfare. Parasitic behaviour involves any activities where effort
is devoted to appropriating the fruits of other people’s labour. If everyone were only to
concentrate on producing the maximum that they were capable of, then, of necessity, the
aggregate product would be as large as it could possibly be. The problem, of course, is that
parasitic behaviour is frequently more attractive to the individual than honest toil. It
is evident in the problems of crime and corruption which plague many societies.
Protectionism and lobbying government for transfer payments or indeed any other kinds
of rent-seeking behaviour would be other examples. In Smith’s day it was the granting of
monopoly rights which was at issue.
From the point of view of societal production, parasitism involves two costs: firstly
there is the production foregone as a result of the energy devoted to it; secondly there is
the cost incurred by producers in protecting themselves against it. Indeed, parasitism may
be viewed as a negative sum game: the total product is lower when one agent is parasitic
than when everyone cooperates.
1 This paper is based in part on an earlier unpublished working paper (Wittenberg, 1999). I thank
Johann Fedderke for comments on that working paper. The editor and an anonymous referee
provided helpful comments that improved this article. All errors are, of course, my responsibility.
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A simple model that has some of the flavour of this type of interaction is the
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Both players would be better off if they were to cooperate, but
each player is tempted to “sucker” the opponent and so ends up with the “defect”
strategy. It is easy to see why such Nash equilibria are suboptimal from a societal point
of view. Of course, the Prisoners’ Dilemma is too simple a game to allow one to
examine how changes in the structure of the interaction might make the players more
or less cooperative. In this paper we will discuss a generalised version of a predation
model introduced by Hirshleifer (1988, 1991a, 1995) and Skaperdas (1991, 1992,
1996). In this model the choices available to the players are not discrete but
continuous. One might think of it as a continuous version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma
(see also Killingback, Doebeli and Knowlton, 1999), in which the players can pick a
level of cooperation anywhere between 0% (totally parasitic) to 100% (totally
cooperative). We will analyse the nature of the equilibria in this game. Ultimately we
are concerned with the size and determinants of the welfare loss incurred by society
through predatory behaviour. We have four key parameters in our model: the level of
inequality, the relative level of productive efficiency, the relative level of appropriation
strength and the decisiveness of the appropriation effort. We will show that sufficiently
large changes in these parameters will induce one of the players to become a complete
parasite. Full parasitism by one of the players, however, does not necessarily translate
into big welfare losses. Indeed we will show that there are two circumstances under
which welfare losses are minimised: a regime in which institutions do not reward
claiming behaviour, and a regime in which claiming is relatively successful but one of
the players becomes marginalised. These results may provide some insights into why
societies in transition from highly authoritarian regimes seem especially prone to high
levels of crime and corruption.
The plan of the discussion is as follows. In the next section we briefly review some
of the relevant literature. We show how our model relates to a number of other models
of predation. We present the model formally in section 3. The first step in the analysis
is to discuss the incentives of the players and we do this by deriving the nature of the
reaction functions in section 4. We obtain expressions for the Cournot equilibria in
section 5. In the case of interior equilibria these are closed form solutions while the
corner equilibria can only be characterized implicitly. Nevertheless we can accurately
sign the comparative static derivatives. We do this in section 6. We use these results to
characterise the determinants of the welfare losses in section 7 and discuss these further
in the conclusion.
2. PRODUCTION AND APPROPRIATION
The argument that appropriation is an interesting and in some ways fundamental
economic issue has been made forcefully by Hirshleifer (1978, 1991b), and Garfinkel
and Skaperdas (1996). Hirshleifer suggests that the “political economy” of trade and
barter rests on a “natural economy” based on appropriation. The emergence of laws
and cooperation (Axelrod, 1984) is what enables this transition. Nevertheless these
institutions are inevitably imperfect.
“For that matter a perfectly law-abiding individual (if there is any such) could not have such confidence in
third-party enforcement as to entirely forego personal vigilance and self-defense.” (Hirshleifer, 1978, p. 238)
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Garfinkel and Skaperdas draw attention to how the literature on rent-seeking
reintroduces the “political” element to political economy. In these contexts while there
may be property rights, they are only imperfectly defined and appropriation and conflict
re-emerge as legitimate subjects of economic investigation. Similarly Baumol (1990) has
suggested that the function of entrepreneurship is misunderstood, if it is viewed only in
a narrow trading sense – pirates and monopolists are successful entrepreneurs too. What
is important from the perspective of maximising the long-run well-being of society is
whether it is appropriative or productive entrepreneurship that is being promoted.
A number of different approaches to modelling forcible appropriation have been
presented in the literature. On the one hand, there are models of particular types of
appropriation or conflict. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) model corruption; Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny (1993) look at rent-seeking; Garfinkel (1990) investigates arms races;
Grossman (1991, 1994) looks at rural insurrections and land reform; while Usher (1989)
looks at despotism and its breakdown.
Besides being focused on particular types of appropriation, some of these models posit
an ex ante heterogeneity in agents: in Grossman’s insurrection model, for example,
peasants have a choice about whether they produce or become bandits, but they cannot
become rulers. In Grossman and Kim (1996), there is a potential predator and a potential
prey, while in their later model (2000) there are moral and amoral agents. In some models
this heterogeneity does not exist between agents, but applies to the particular roles that
these agents can choose to play. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) and Acemoglu
(1995), for example, present models in which agents can engage in rent-seeking or in
production but these roles are disjoint: a producer cannot, as it were, exercise any form of
power in order to ward off the exactions of the predator. The choice is between paying up
or joining them. Indeed as a result both papers have to treat the size of the transfer as
exogenously fixed. If producers do not fight back, the size of the transfer cannot be
endogenously determined.
The most general conflictual model of appropriation (and variants thereof ) has been
presented by Hirshleifer (1988, 1991a, 1995) and Skaperdas (1991, 1992, 1996). The
key elements of this model are:
(i) A resource partition function
This indicates how the basic resource available to each player is divided between
production and appropriation. It is assumed that these are the two types of activities
open to each individual. Some authors, notably Grossman and Kim (1995, 1996, 2000),
distinguish between expenditures on offence and defence. This introduces potential
asymmetries between players which are interesting, but complicate the analysis.
(ii) The aggregate production function
In Hirshleifer (1988, 1991a) and Skaperdas (1992) total appropriable output is a function
of the productive investments made by each player, while in Hirshleifer (1995) essentially
private production functions for each player replace the aggregate production function.
(iii) The contest success function
This determines the probability of winning the contest2 as a function of the strengths of
the two players, although it can also be thought of as the “sharing rule” between the
2 In most models the contest is about the output. In Hirshleifer (1995) it determines how the
overall resource base is split between the players.
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players, under the threat of conflict (Skaperdas, 1992, p.723). A number of possible
functional forms have been investigated (see Hirshleifer (1989, 1991b) and Skaperdas
(1996); also Dixit (1987)) but the most popular form is the ratio form
p
b s










where si and sj are the relative fighting strengths of player i and j respectively and m is a
“decisiveness” parameter.3 This has the desirable property that scaling the contests up does
not affect the outcome. Since the units in which these strengths are measured are arbitrary
this is a positive feature.4
(iv) The income distribution equation
The final allocation, interpreted either as the expected payoff (if there is war) or actual
payoff (if the contest success function is interpreted as a sharing rule), to each player is
given by an equation of the sort
y p yi i=
where y is aggregate output.
The solution concept which is most usually applied to the analysis of this interaction
is that of the Cournot equilibrium. Hirshleifer (1988) investigates the Stackelberg
equilibrium as well although to his surprise the Stackelberg solution does not differ from
the Cournot solution.5
One of the most striking results to have emerged from the analysis of this model is
what Hirshleifer has dubbed the “paradox of power” (Hirshleifer, 1991a): that conflict
can be an equalising force. An agent that initially has smaller resources may be motivated
to fight much harder when facing a more powerful opponent. As a result we may see a
transfer from the richer player to the poorer one in equilibrium. Hirshleifer notes that this
result is contingent on the weaker player not being driven to a corner. If the weaker player
is devoting all resources to fighting, then an increase in the strength of the more powerful
player can no longer be matched by the weaker one, so that the larger resources eventually
predominate. Furthermore the decisiveness parameter m plays an important part in
determining how large the disequilibrium in resources can be, before the power of the
richer player asserts itself.
Whereas Hirshleifer resorted to various simulations, we have explicit analytical
solutions for all of the results. We are therefore not restricted to presenting analyses based
on particular parameter values. Instead we can characterise the outcomes in a general way.
3 We will discuss the interpretation of m in more detail below.
4 The other functional form considered in the literature, the logit form does not have this feature,
hence its relative lack of use, despite some attractive properties (Hirshleifer, 1989).
5 Indeed in Hirshleifer’s “anarchy” model (1995) the Stackelberg leader performs relatively less
well than the follower. The reason for this difference is that in this model the contest is over the
underlying resource and not over the output of production.
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3. THE MODEL
We assume that there are two players who we will label A and B (and some times 1 and
2), which follows the template of the appropriation model outlined above.
(i) Wealth partition function
Each player has an initial endowment of wealth WA and WB respectively, and the choice
confronting them is how to allocate these resources to productive Ei and claiming
activities Fi respectively. Since we will be interested in characterising how “cooperative” or
“predatory” a player is, we will focus mainly on the proportions of resources, a and b,
devoted to production by each player. We have
E W E WA A B B= =α βand (1)
F W F WA A B B= −( ) = −( )1 1α β, (2)
(ii) Aggregate production function
We assume that the aggregate production function YAB is such that ∂YAB/∂Ei > 0 and
YAB(0, 0) = 0. Some of the results can be derived for this arbitrary specification, but we
will generally make the more restrictive assumption that the production function is
separable in the products of A and B, i.e. YAB = YA + YB, where YA and YB are the outputs
of A and B respectively.6 With this specification it is possible to unambiguously identify
the contributions of A and B, which helps to identify whether the final allocation exhibits
parasitism or not. In the discussions below we have chosen particular functional forms
given by:
Y c E Y c EA A Ah B B Bh= =, (3)
where cA and cB are productivity parameters and h is a return to scale parameter. We will
restrict our attention here to the constant returns case h = 1.
(iii) The appropriation function
Since we are interested in situations of long-run predation, we interpret the contest
success function as a “sharing rule” in the sense of Skaperdas (1992). The function
therefore determines how much each player is able to appropriate, rather than each
player’s probability of winning the entire amount. We assume that the functions are given





















where s1(.) and s2(.) are functions that depend on FA and FB only. In particular we assume
s f F s f FA A B B1 2= =, (5)
6 Many of the simulations presented by Hirshleifer (1988, 1991a) fit into this model, so the results
can be compared to the analytical results presented below.
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where the fi are “appropriation efficiency” parameters. They indicate how effective each
player is in turning her fighting resources into claiming strength. We allow these to be
different, because different agents may not have access to the same fighting or claiming
technology. In the case of feudal societies knowledge about how to produce certain types
of weapons would have been closely guarded secrets of the nobility. In more recent times,
apartheid South Africa imposed legal restrictions on the ability of black South Africans to
get access to guns. There were also restrictions on the kinds of legal claims that blacks
could make on property. All of these would have severely impaired the efficiency with
which claims could be established.
The choice of the ratio form for the appropriation function is motivated not only by
its popularity in other contexts, such as its use in the rent-seeking literature (Rosen, 1986,
Gradstein and Konrad, 1999). It is also motivated by the fact that it is homogeneous of
degree zero in the arguments FA and FB. This means that a balanced increase in the
resources available to each player and devoted to claiming, will not affect the overall
shares. Furthermore, as Hirshleifer has argued (1991b, p.104), the ratio form is probably
most appropriate for contexts in which there is a lot of mutual information and there is
no place to hide.
One implication of the ratio form is that a player that does not manage to stake any
claim, will receive nothing, even if that player has contributed the largest share of the total
output. Claiming activities should therefore not be thought of as intrinsically illegitimate.
People who do not engage in efforts to establish their rights to particular resources or then
to defend those rights are likely to be taken advantage of. In this sense claiming is not only
an alternative to production, but also a necessary complement (if the other player is likely
to engage in claiming, that is).
This view of human nature is not that far fetched. Entire professions have grown up
around the establishment and enforcement of claims. Litigation, the registration of title
deeds or the registration of patents are all examples of claiming activities in this sense.
Lobbying government for welfare payments or for a reduction of taxes would be others.
Furthermore the outcomes of these contestations need not be related to the intrinsic
merits of the cases, but may often just reflect the relative skills of the lawyers or politicians
involved.
The parameter m in the appropriation function deserves a more detailed comment. It
is a decisiveness parameter – it records how sensitive the final division of aggregate output
is to claiming behaviour. With a low m claiming activities are relatively ineffective and the
final output is more or less equally divided. With high m claims become highly effective
and the final shares come to reflect the respective energy that was put into making claims
on the output. With an extremely large m, the person with the largest muscle gets to keep
everything.
It should be noted that m is a reflection of the social values and technologies available
within a society. We might list some of them as follows:
• cultural factors: A society’s attitude towards wealth and inequality would definitely
affect m. A great belief in equality would tend to reduce m, while a high tolerance for
inequality would drive up m;
• military technology: The more sophisticated the tools of destruction, the more leverage
the owners of those implements would tend to have on the division of the product, i.e.
this would drive up m;
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• storage technology: Limits on the ability to store and transport wealth (e.g. the presence
or absence of grain silos) would tend to reduce m.
(iv) The income distribution equation
The final payoffs to each player are given by
Y g c E c E Y g c E c EA A Ah B Bh B A Ah B Bh1 2= +[ ] = +[ ],
Our key concern is to analyse the effects of the strategic interactions around
appropriation and production. It is evident that if both players claim only and do not
produce, then there will be no product to split. This, however, cannot be an
equilibrium: if the other player is determined to be an absolute parasite, it would be in
my interest to produce something, because even a small share of a positive output
would be preferable to absolute no return at all. The balance between appropriation
and production that we will see ought to depend on the productiveness of the players,
their effectiveness in establishing claims, their respective wealth and the degree to which
claiming is an effective activity.
We will in general be more concerned with analysing the effects of relative changes in
wealth and productivity. We therefore reparameterise our model, letting
k W W p c c f f fA B A B A B= = =, , (6)
We interpret k as our index of inequality, p as an index of productivity differentials
and f as an index of A’s relative claiming strength. Without loss of generality we will
assume throughout that B is the less productive individual, i.e. p  1. With this
reparameterisation, cB and WB, now function as scale parameters. Increases in cB and WB,
(for fixed values of p and k) lead to increases in the productivity or wealth of both players.
To signal this change, we drop the subscript.7
By substituting equation (1) into the production function; equation (2) into the
“strength equation” (5) and that in turn into the appropriation success function (4) and
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We will make the Cournot assumption that players treat their opponent’s choice of
cooperativeness as fixed. This means that the one-period equilibrium will be at the
intersection of the respective reaction functions, where these give the optimal values of a
(or b) given the opponents choice of b (or a). For interior solutions the reaction functions
will be given by the loci of the solutions to
7 A similar point applies to f, of course. The “baseline” appropriation efficiency fB does not feature
in the payoff function, however, so there is no need to concern ourselves with this issue.
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∂ ∂ ∂ ∂Y Y1 20 0α β= =,
Hirshleifer’s results, however, should alert us to the fact that we are not guaranteed to
get interior solutions. There will be combinations of the parameters for which one of the
players becomes completely parasitic. Indeed the possibility of complete parasitism and its
effects on the interactions with the other player turn out to be absolutely crucial for the
behaviour of the model.
4. REACTION FUNCTIONS
We begin by analyzing the reaction functions. By definition a reaction function plots
the optimal choice for a particular player, given a variety of choices by the opponent.
In this particular case this optimum has to balance two countervailing forces: on the
one hand raising production will increase the pie for everyone; on the other this will
reduce the effectiveness of one’s claim. In some cases (particularly when the opponent
is contributing very little) increasing the size of the pie might benefit the player more
than squabbling more vigorously over non-existent crumbs. These sort of trade-offs
underlie the reaction functions that we have graphed in Fig. 1. This diagram shows
some reaction functions and the locus of Cournot equilibria for a particular set of
parameters. It is evident that beyond a critical level of inequality (k = 5 in the diagram),
Player B becomes completely parasitic. Indeed for higher levels of inequality B’s
reaction function moves very sharply down to zero and then stays at zero until A shows
excessively high degrees of cooperation.
We observe a number of features. When k = 10 we note that A’s reaction function rA
increases monotonically while B’s reaction function rB very rapidly goes to zero, then stays
































Figure 1. Reaction functions and Cournot equilibria for a various levels of inequality k. The
reaction functions are indicated by the light lines, while the locus of equilibria is indicated
by the heavy curve. Large dots indicate intersections of the reaction functions shown in
the diagram. Parameters: f = 1, p = 1, m = 0.5
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that both reaction functions have a unique turning point in the interior of the unit square.
Indeed, this is our first result:
Proposition 1 There are three types of reaction functions:
1. Type one increases monotonically on the interval [0, 1] and is such that ri  1/(m + 1)
2. Type two is differentiable with a unique turning point in (0, 1)
3. Type three is differentiable except at two points d1 and d2. It decreases on an interval [0, d1],
is equal to zero on an interal [d1, d2] and increases on [d2, 1).
In all cases the reaction function is quasi-convex with ri (0)  1/(m + 1) and ri (x) → 1 as
x → 1. Furthermore if any player has a reaction function of type one, then the opponent will
have a reaction function of type three, while if any player has a reaction function of type two,
then the opponent will also have a type two reaction function.
The fact that all reaction functions start at a point higher than 1/(m + 1) is evident in
Figure 1. Indeed it is clear why this has to be the case. If A is completely parasitic then B
is compelled to produce, if she wants a positive payoff. As a increases, this compulsion
gradually disappears. In our diagram B’s response is to immediately increase her levels of
claiming (i.e. B’s reaction functions are of type 2 or 3). This is due to two factors. At
higher levels of a A is producing positive output which adds to aggregate output. This
increases the incentive for B to claim. On the other hand, as a increases, A’s level of
claiming activity goes down. This makes B’s claims relatively much more effective. The
combination of increased incentive with increased effectiveness leads to the decrease in
the reaction functions observed in the diagram. This decrease happens until either B
becomes a complete parasite or until the Cournot equilibrium is reached. In the case of
complete parasitism the reaction function eventually reappears and converges on b = 1 at
a high enough level of a. Essentially at these levels of a A is doing such little claiming that
B is left with almost the total output. In these situations it is in B’s interests to start
producing to increase the total output. Although B becomes more cooperative, the
reaction function stays far below the 45° line in this region, so B devotes relatively much
larger resources to claiming than A.
A’s optimal choice is obviously influenced by similar considerations. One additional
point to note is that if A is substantially wealthier than B (e.g. k = 10 in the diagram), then
we have a type 1 reaction function: there is no longer any incentive for A to increase her
claiming activities as B becomes more cooperative. The additional resources that she can
obtain from her own production far outweigh the benefits she might gain by claiming
from B.
5. COURNOT EQUILIBRIA
A Cournot equilibrium (or Nash equilibrium) occurs when both players have no
incentive to change their strategy even when they know what the other player will do. In
this case two forces will exactly counterbalance each other: the additional gains to either
player from additional production will be exactly offset by the losses accrued from a
decreasing share of the pie. In Fig. 1 we see that the intersection always seems to occur at
the respective minima of the functions. When k = 10, the Cournot equilibrium occurs
where B is completely parasitic (i.e. B’s reaction function is at its minimum). Furthermore
A’s reaction function increases monotonically, so that in fact the value of a at the
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equilibrium is also at a minimum. A visual inspection of the interior Cournot equilibria
also suggests that the reaction functions intersect at their respective turning points. This
is our second result:
Proposition 2 There are two types of Cournot equilibria
1. A type one equilibrium is at the intersection of a type one and a type three reaction function.
In this case one player will be completely parasitic and the other player will fix the degree of
cooperativeness at ri(0)
2. A type two equilibrium is at the intersection of two type two reaction functions. These
curves intersect at right angles at their respective minima.
In all cases, therefore, the Cournot equilibrium has the curious property that it represents
the maximally uncooperative point on either player’s reaction function. Equivalently, it is
the point at which both players spend the most energy on claiming, given that this level
must be rational on some hypothesis about the opponent’s behaviour. It can be shown
that this property depends only on the fact that the production function is separable in
the inputs of the two players.
The exact equilibrium that is reached is dependent on the parameters of the model. We
can, however, derive expressions for all equilibria. These are collected in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3 Let (α , β ) be a Cournot solution. Then















































−( ) = +( ) −[ ]+β βm m mf k m (11)
3. If (α , 0) is a corner Cournot equilibrium where B is completely parasitic, then α is
implicitly defined by
1 1 11−( ) = +( ) −+α αm m mf k m (12)
Furthermore (α , β ) will be an interior Cournot equilibrium if, and only if,
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A will be completely parasitic if the first inequality is reversed and B will be completely
parasitic if the last inequality is reversed.
The theorem is useful not only because it provides expressions for the equilibrium levels
of cooperativenes of each player, but because it also indicates some of the more subtle
properties of the solution. In the first instance, none of the solutions depend on either c
or W. This implies that the optimal level of production never depends on the baseline
wealth or productiveness of society. Secondly, the equations for the optimal
cooperativeness at a corner are independent of p. This implies that once one of the players
has become completely parasitic, changes in the relative productivity of the players no
longer has an effect (except in so far as it may shift a player right out of the corner). The
player who is left as the sole producer will fix the optimal level of production only in terms
of the relative wealth and relative ability to appropriate the product. We will return to this
point below.
6. THE IMPACT OF THE PARAMETERS
The results in the theorem above can be used also to explore the comparative statics of the
model. As diagram 1 suggests, increases in the relative wealth of A (i.e. k) would make A
more cooperative and B less so. It is less evident how the other parameters would affect
the outcome, particularly at the corners. The comparative statics can be summarised in
the following Theorem:
Theorem 4 Let (α , β ) be any Cournot equilibrium. Then
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂α βk k≥ ≤0 0,
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂α βp p≥ ≤0 0,
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂α βf f≥ ≤0 0,
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂α ζ β ζm iff g g m iff g gA B B A≥ ≤( ) ≥ ≤( ) ≥ ≤( ) ≥ ≤( )0 0,
where z is the solution of the equation ln z = 1/z + 1, i.e. z ª 3.591121
These results, except for the last one, seem intuitively obvious and extend the findings of
Hirshleifer’s simulations (1988, 1991a). We will discuss them briefly one by one.
(1). Inequality of wealth: An increase in A’s wealth relative to B makes A more cooperative
and B less so. As a player becomes more wealthy, a smaller proportion of resources devoted
to claiming will have the same effect. Consequently the individual who becomes more
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affluent can afford to devote more resources to production. The poorer individual,
becomes more specialised in claiming. This is part of what drives Hirshleifer’s “paradox
of power”.
(2). Relative productivity: If A becomes more productive relative to B, then A would tend
to become more cooperative. The result is again intuitive: the costs of production
foregone increase for the person who becomes more productive. For the less productive
individual the gains from own production start looking less attractive relative to what can
be gained by claiming from the other player.
(3). Changes in claiming efficiency: If A becomes more effective in establishing claims
relative to B, then A becomes more cooperative. This result makes sense if one remembers
that an increasing claiming effectiveness implies that A gets to keep a larger share of her
output. It therefore becomes in her interest to enlarge the output. For the player who loses
ground in the claiming stakes, it is in their interest to increase their claiming effort and
so reduce the productive effort.
(4). Changes in the decisiveness of claiming: If claiming becomes more decisive, then we
would expect both players to spend more time claiming and less time producing. In fact
the result above is nicely ambivalent. If the players are relatively evenly matched, then an
increase in the decisiveness parameter would unambiguously increase the amount of
claiming activities. However, if there is a large imbalance in the power of the players, then
the player who currently extracts the lion’s share would actually become more productive,
since this power now obviously translates into a much larger impact. This feature – greater
decisiveness increases all claiming when players are evenly matched, but may reduce it
when the contest is lopsided – seems to be an important insight that is not apparent from
the Hirshleifer simulations.
The above results are true for marginal changes in the parameters around a given
equilibrium. Larger changes in the parameters will potentially change the nature of the
equilibrium, e.g. driving an interior solution to one or other of the corners. We can
characterise the impact of these changes also:
Theorem 5 The limiting behaviour of the Cournot equilibrium (α , β ) consequent on changes
in the parameters is as follows:
1. Impact of p
As p → • player B becomes completely parasitic. The limiting value of α will be implicitly
defined by equation 12.
As p → 0 player A becomes completely parasitic and the limiting value of β will be defined
by equation 11.
2. Impact of f
lim limf fand mpk m if k mp→∞ →∞= = −( ) +( ) ≤α β1 1 1 1
lim limf fand if k mp→∞ →∞= = >α β1 0 1
lim limf fpk m m pk and if k m p→ →= −( ) +( )[ ] = ≥0 01 1α β
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lim limf fand if k m p→ →= = <0 00 1α β
3. Impact of k
lim limk kand→∞ →∞= =α β1 0
lim limk kand→ →= =0 00 1α β
4. Impact of m
lim limm kfk and if fk→∞ →∞= − = >α β1 1 0 1
lim limm kand if fk→∞ →∞= = =α β0 0 1
lim limm kand fk if fk→∞ →∞= = − <α β0 1 1
lim limm mand→ →= =0 01 1α β
In most cases large enough changes in the parameters will shift the solution to where one
of the players becomes completely parasitic. Often the player who is richest and most
effective in claiming also becomes most focussed on production, while the weak and poor
player ends up as the parasite. This is one of the dimensions of Hirshleifer’s “Paradox of
Power”.
7. WELFARE ANALYSIS
We are now ready to analyse the societal impacts of predation and how these are affected
by changes in the parameters. In order to do this we define as our index of the welfare loss:
I Y Y Y= −( )max maxAB (14)
where Ymax = c (pk + 1)W, i.e. it is the maximum output that could be produced if both
players produced at full capacity. Obviously I is bounded between zero and one.
Theorem 6 Let (α , β ) be any Cournot equilibrium. Then
1. If (α , β ) is an interior Cournot equilibrium then I = m/(m + 1) and hence
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂I p I k I f= = = 0
2. If (α , 0) is a corner Cournot equilibrium where B is completely parasitic, then
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂I p I k I f< < <0 0 0, ,
3. If (0, β ) is a corner Cournot equilibrium where A is completely parasitic, then
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∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂I p I k I f> > >0 0 0, ,
4. The behaviour of I in the limit is given by
limp I a where a is defined by equation→∞ = −1 12
limp I where is defined by equation→ = −0 1 11β β
lim limk kI I→∞ →= =0 00,
lim limf fI if k mp I m m if k mp→∞ →∞= > = +( ) ≤0 1 1 1,
lim limf fI if k m p I m m if k m p→ →= < = +( ) ≥0 00 1,
limm I p f pfk f if fk→∞ = +( ) +( ) > 1
limm I if fk→∞ = =1 1
limm I pk fk pk if fk→∞ = +( ) +( ) <1 1
limm I→ =0 0
The most startling implication of these findings is that the welfare losses tend to be
biggest when the players are relatively evenly matched. It is only in the “corner” equilibria
that the losses start to decline. The reason for these relatively big losses is due to the fact
that evenly matched players can inflict a lot of damage on each other. They therefore have
to invest a lot in claiming capacity. This result is not so surprising when one considers the
level of military expenditure that relatively evenly matched countries deem necessary for
their own survival. The reason why this finding strikes us as paradoxical is that in fairly
equal societies the net parasitism rate should be fairly low. Indeed this is the case, even in
our model. In Fig. 2 we contrast the evolution of social welfare losses attendant on
increasing inequality (k) with the evolution of the individual losses. The latter we define
as the proportional difference between what the individual produces versus what they end
up getting. In this case it is (YA-Y1)/YA. At very low levels of inequality the welfare losses
are high, but the individual losses are low. The reason for this divergence is that the
“claiming” expenditures of the two players cancel each other out. This welfare loss is large,
but since each player gets more or less what they produce, the players would not find the
end result unfair. The net parasitism rate is low, but the welfare loss is high.
At high levels of inequality both the individual losses and the social welfare losses start
to decline. The reason for this is that the weaker player simply lacks the resources to inflict
meaningful damage on the stronger one. Again this is a result that has resonance in real
developments: it was only when the poorer sections of the South African population
gained access to weaponry, the money to engage lawyers or to corrupt the police that
crime for the richer citizens became a notable problem. We observe (in Figure 2) that the
individual losses can be substantially larger than the social losses. The reason for this is
that the actual losses sustained by the richer individuals are transferred to the poorer
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player. The social losses, however, are the deadweight losses: the overall reduction in
output irrespective of how this output is actually divided.
An efficient outcome, i.e. one in which I = 0, is reached under two scenarios: firstly if
m = 0, i.e. if the allocation rule is completely insensitive to claiming activity. In this case
both players focus entirely on production because there is simply no point in doing
anything else. The second efficient outcome occurs if the strength of one of the players
becomes completely overwhelming. This happens either when inequality k is driven to
either extreme, or when f becomes extreme, with k sufficiently large (or small) also. In
this case the outcome is reasonably efficient simply because the parasitic player is so
insignificant, that the output lost is so small relative to the output produced that it hardly
matters.
Interestingly enough, increasing the productivity, strength or wealth of the parasitic
player will increase the welfare losses. There are several effects at work here. Small changes
in these parameters will not induce the player to start becoming productive. They do,
however, increase the damage that such claiming can inflict on the productive player, thus
increasing defensive claiming activities. On top of this, some of these changes push out
the production possibilities frontier, i.e. Ymax, and hence increase the size of the potential
loss.
The implication of this analysis is that high inequality societies might paradoxically be
more efficient than low inequality societies, when the effectiveness of claiming is large.
Theft, malicious litigation and political lobbying all require resources. If the poor player
is sufficiently marginalised she does not have sufficient resources to launch serious
challenges. Furthermore she would not be capable of producing all that much either. On
both counts the efficiency losses from the predation are consequently small.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have set up and solved out a generalised version of the Hirshleifer-














Figure 2. Social welfare losses and individual losses (to the richer player) with increases in
inequality. At k = 1 social welfare losses are high, but individual losses are zero. Parameter
settings: f = 1, p = 1, m = 0.5
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predation and the attendant welfare losses in more detail than has hitherto been possible.
The most striking conclusion to arise from this analysis is that predation is minimised
under two quite different regimes. If the institutional framework makes claiming very
ineffective we would expect people to focus on productive work. This is the Smithian
solution. Strong, clear property rights can minimise unproductive claiming. If, however,
claiming is effective, then the effects of predation can be minimised only if one of the
players becomes marginalised. The worst outcomes seem to arise when claiming is
effective, but inequality in power is significant but not extreme. This, arguably, is the
situation in a number of transition societies.
A third route through which the effect of predation might be minimised is through
repeated interactions. It is, for instance, well known that cooperative outcomes can be
sustained as subgame perfect equilibria in the repeated version of the Prisoners’
Dilemma. Since our game can be thought of as a continuous version of the discrete
choice Prisoners’ Dilemma the same logic indicates that 100% cooperation should be
sustainable in the repeated version of the predation game. A simple trigger strategy of
the sort “cooperate at 100% until any player defects, then play the Nash equilibrium”
should be sufficient. This suggests that cooperation may be sustainable even in contexts
where claiming is effective, provided that the agents in that society expect repercussions
from their actions in the future. The question of which institutions would promote
such a long-term horizon is beyond the scope of this paper. Social norms, moral codes
and religion may all have a role to play. Indeed this is a fascinating avenue for research.
Nevertheless we leave a proper analysis of a dynamic version of this game for future
work. The fact that we have closed form solutions of the static model should facilitate
such analyses. Indeed it should also enable extensions to this predation framework and
its articulation with other types of models. One possible direction in which such work
could go would be to analyse the “evolutionary” logic of such a system given agents of
limited memory. This line of enquiry pioneered by Axelrod (1984) has led to a
burgeoning research programme (see for instance Nowak and Sigmund, 1992, Nowak
and Sigmund, 1993).
APPENDIX – Proofs
We will generally present proofs for only one of the players. By a suitable retranslation of
the parameters, we can deduce the results for the other player.
Proposition A.1 For a given value of b we have that ∂Y1/∂a () 0 as Y2 ()
(1 - a)/m · ∂YAB/∂a. Similarly for a given value of a we have that ∂Y2/∂b () 0 as Y1 ()
(1 - b)/m · ∂YAB/∂b
Proof. This follows by straightforward differentiation of the payoff functions Y1 and Y2.
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since s2 does not depend on a. The sign of ∂Y1/∂a therefore depends only on the
expression in square brackets. Furthermore we have ∂s1/∂a < 0 so the sign of ∂Y1/∂a will
be the opposite of the term in brackets. We can simplify the latter by noting that
s1 = fA (1 - a)WA, so s s1 1 1
∂
∂
= − −( )
α
α , i.e. the expression in square brackets can be
written as gBYAB - (1 - a)/m · ∂YAB/∂a. Since Y2 = gBYAB the result follows.
Note that this result depends only on the nature of the appropriation function, it does
not depend on the nature of the aggregate production function.
Proposition A.2 Given the choices of functional forms in section 3, the payoff function Y1(a|b,
k, p, f, m, c, W) can be of two types:
1. It can have its global maximum in the interior, i.e. a ∈ (0, 1)
2. It can have its global maximum at a = 0
Proof. The proof follows from proposition A.1. We note that (1 - a)/m · ∂YAB/∂a is
monotonically decreasing in a with (1 - a)/m · ∂YAB/∂a = 0 when a = 1, while at this
point Y2 > 0, hence ∂Y1/∂a < 0 near a = 1. Furthermore Y2 is monotonically increasing
in a, hence we need consider only what happens at a = 0. If Y2 > 1/m · ∂ YAB/∂a at
a = 0, then ∂Y1/∂a will be negative on the entire interval [0, 1). If, however, the payoff
function initially slopes upward, then it must reach a turning point from where it
decreases. Hence it must have a global maximum in the interior. It follows from this
proposition that A’s reaction function will be given by the solutions to the equation
∂Y1/∂a = 0 (where a turning point on the payoff function exists) and otherwise by
a = 0.
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Proof. This follows from proposition A.1
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provided that the denominator is not zero.
Proof. This follows from the implicit function theorem. An interior optimum will be at
a point where ∂Y1/∂a = 0. From proposition A.1 we note that the locus of solutions can
be defined implicitly by -m/(1 - a)Y2 + ∂YAB/∂a ≡ 0. Letting F(a, b) = -m/(1 - a)Y2 +
∂YAB/∂a we have that ∂a/∂b = - Fb/Fa. The result follows.
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Proposition A.5 With our choice of functional forms, the slope of A’s reaction function at
any point (a, b) with a = rA(b) will be such that ∂a/∂b ()0 if, and only if ∂Y2(a, b)/
∂b () 0
Proof. We note that with our choice of functional form we have ∂2YAB/
























and the denominator of this is guaranteed to be positive.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1 of the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is in three parts. First we show that near b = 0 and
b = 1 A’s optimal response is in the interior, and, indeed, A’s optimal response will be
large. In other words both if B is completely parasitic and if B is completely cooperative,
it is in A’s interest to produce a positive amount. Secondly we then consider the slope of
the reaction function ∂a/∂b. We show that if this reaction function is ever positive at any
b*, it will be positive for all b to the right of b*. From this we can deduce what shapes the
reaction functions can take. In the third part, we show that the shape of A’s reaction
function has implications for the shape of B’s reaction function and vice versa.
The proof of the first part is a straightforward application of proposition A.1. We show
that if b = 0 then if a = 0 we evidently have Y2 = 0, while (1 - a)/m · ∂YAB/∂a > 0. It
follows that the payoff function has an interior maximum. This maximum satisfies
equation 15. Substituting in b = 0 we see that the optimal a has to satisfy the equation
1 1 11−( ) = +( ) −+α αm m mf k m
This will have a solution in the interval (1/(m + 1), 1). Hence it follows that all A’s
reaction functions start with a > 1/(m + 1). Near b = 1 we will have Y2 near zero and
(1 - a)/m · ∂YAB/∂a > 0, hence there will also be an interior solution. From this it follows
that as b → 1 we must have a → 1, since otherwise equality in equation 15 could not
obtain.
To prove the second part, we consider a point (a*, b*) on A’s reaction curve, i.e.
a* = rA(b*) where by assumption ∂a/∂b > 0. We have, by proposition A.5 that
∂a/∂b > 0 if, and only if ∂Y2(a,b)/∂b < 0. Now of course proposition A.1 implies
that ∂Y2(a,b)/∂b < 0 if, and only if, Y1 > (1 - b)/m · ∂YAB/∂b. We show that along A’s
reaction curve we must have Y1 increasing. Totally differentiating, we have
d d d dY Y Y1 1 1β β α α β= + ⋅∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
Now at every point along A’s reaction function we have ∂Y1/∂a = 0 so we must have
dY1/db > 0. So if at b* we have Y1 > (1 - b)/m · ∂YAB/∂b then it must be true at every
b > b*, since the right hand side of this inequality is independent of a and decreasing in
b. It follows that if ∂a/∂b > 0 at (a*, b*) then it will stay positive for b > b*. This means
that the behaviour of the reaction function depends on its behaviour at b = 0. If it is
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increasing at this point, then it will continue to increase, i.e. we will have a type one
reaction function. If it decreases, then it must eventually reverse its direction, since we
have seen that as b → 1 we must have a → 1. This reversal of direction can happen in
one of two ways: the locus of solutions to the equation ∂Y1/∂a = 0 can have a turning
point, i.e. at this point ∂a/∂b = 0, or it can become undefined, in which case the reaction
function has reached the corner solution a = 0 at some value b1. At a higher value b2,
however, the reaction function will take on positive values again and from this point on
(since the slope is now positive), it will converge on one. The former corresponds to our
type two reaction curves, while the latter to a type 3 curve.
To prove the third part, we note that if A has a type 1 reaction function then at b = 0
we have ∂a/∂b > 0. By proposition A.5 we must have at A’s optimal response a* = rA(0)
that ∂Y2/∂b < 0. This means, in turn, by proposition A.2 that B’s payoff function when
a = a* is monotonically decreasing in b. There is therefore no interior solution to the
equation ∂Y2/∂b = 0 at this a. B’s reaction function is therefore of type 3 and it is at a
corner when a = a*.
If A has a type two reaction function, then its turning point will be at a point
(α , β ) where ∂a/∂b = 0. By proposition A.5 we must have ∂Y2/∂b = 0 at this point.
This, however, implies that B’s payoff function reaches its maximum also at (α , β ), i.e.
this is the point at which the reaction functions intersect. This is sufficient to show that
B also has a type two reaction function.
If A has a type three reaction function, then there will be a range of values of b for
which the best response is at a = 0. For these values of b we will have ∂Y1/∂a < 0 at a = 0.
By proposition A.1 we must have Y2 > 1/m · ∂YAB/∂a in this range. But B’s optimal
response b* to A’s choice a = 0, i.e. b* = rB(0) must fall into this range, since if for some
b we have Y2 > 1/m · ∂YAB/∂a, then certainly maxbY2 > 1/m · ∂YAB/∂a. Now at b* we
have ∂Y1/∂a < 0, so by proposition A.5 (reinterpreted for B) we must have the slope of
rB upwards sloping, i.e. it is a type one reaction function.
Proof of Proposition 2. We have proved proposition 2 in the process of proving
proposition one.

























































Proof. By proposition A.1 the reaction functions must satisfy (respectively)
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g mBY YAB AB= −( ) ⋅1 α α∂ ∂
g mAY YAB AB= −( ) ⋅1 β β∂ ∂
Dividing the latter equation by the former produces the first equation. Adding the two
equations produces the second. Now equation 19 implies that mYAB = ∂YAB/∂a + ∂ YAB/
∂b - (a · ∂YAB/∂a + b · ∂YAB/∂b ). If YAB is homogeneous of degree one in a and b then
a · ∂YAB/∂a + b · ∂YAB/∂b = YAB (Euler’s theorem). Rearranging produces the result.


















pk a m m+( ) −[ ]+ +( ) − =1 1 1 1 0β (21)
Proof. Substitute into equations 18 and 19.














































































































. The left hand side of this is just gA/gB. Then exploiting the fact
that gA + gB = 1, we can solve for gA and gB. To get the expressions for Y1 and Y2 we
note that Y1 = gAYAB and Y2 = gBYAB. By proposition A.6 we have that YAB =
c(pk + 1)W/(m + 1). The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 3. We will derive the conditions for the interior equilibrium first.











































. From equation 21 we get k = [1 - b(m + 1)]/
[p(a(m + 1) - 1)]. Substituting this in, and cross-multiplying (including the term f/p on
the LHS) we get
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1 1 1 1 1 1
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Collecting up terms in a and simplifying we get
1
1





























We substitute this expression back into the equation 22 and solve for b. This gives us
equation 10 of the Theorem. With this expression we substitute back into the equation
above, to obtain the equilibrium value of a, given in equation 9 of the Theorem.
The expressions for the corner equilibria follow by substituting b = 0 into A’s reaction
function (equation 15) and a = 0 into B’s reaction function respectively.
The solutions given in equations 9 and 10 represent a legitimate equilibrium only if
both formulae evaluate to non-negative quantities (they are guaranteed to produce values
less than one). Imposing the conditions α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 and simplifying the respective
equations yields the condition in inequality 13 of the Theorem.
To get the reverse implication, we consider the corner equilibrium (α , β ) with B
parasitic and show that the inequality must be reversed. In this case the following two
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The first follows from equation 15 with b = 0 and the second from the fact that
∂Y2/∂b  0 at a which implies by proposition A.1 that Y1  (1 - b)/m · ∂YAB/∂b. When
we divide each side of inequality 24 by the corresponding side of equation 23 we get
1 1 1−( ) ≥ −( )[ ]α αm m mf k pk
i.e. (1 - a)m+1 fm+1km+1 > f/p, and thus
1
1












Equation 23 can be rearranged to show that (1 - a)m fmkm = [a(m + 1) - 1]/(1 - a).
Substituting this into the left-hand side of the inequality above and simplifying we get
259South African Journal of Economics Vol. 76:2 June 2008
© 2008 The Author.
























































































We have therefore shown that (α , β ) is a corner Cournot equilibrium with B parasitic
only if this last condition holds.The conditions for the other corner equilibrium follow
similarly.
Since there is always guaranteed to be a Cournot equilibrium; since the three cases
exhaust all possibilities; and because these equilibria are uniquely defined by k, p, f and m,
the opposite implications follow.
Proof of Theorem 4. In order to prove Theorem 4 we need to consider separately the
interior from the corner Cournot equilibria. Starting with the interior equilibria, a will
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In order to calculate the comparative statics with respect to m, it is in fact easier to
calculate them with respect to the variable m = m/(m + 1). Since dm/dm > 0 the sign
of ∂ ∂α μ will correspond to the sign of ∂ ∂α m . It is also more convenient to rewrite
α as
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1 . The expression in square brackets is
of the form ln y - 1 - 1/y. Consequently ∂ ∂α μ ≤ ≥( )0 as (f/p)m() z where z is the
root of the equation ln y - 1 - 1/y = 0. The result follows, since proposition A.8 shows
that at an interior equilibrium gA/gB is equal to the left hand side of the last inequality.
For the corner solution, we proceed by implicit differentiation. We assume that B is
parasitic, so that the optimal a is given by the solution to the equation
1 1 11−( ) = +( ) −+α αm m mf k m
Let q (a) = (1 - a)m+1fmkm - a (m + 1) + 1. Then α is defined implicitly by q (a) + 0.
We can get the comparative statics on α from the implicit function theorem provided
that qa  0. We have qa = - (m + 1) (1 - a)mfmkm - (m + 1) < 0, so that the numerator
will determine the sign. qk = m(1 - a)m+1fmkm-1 > 0, hence ∂ ∂α k > 0 . Also qf = m(1 -






























f km m +[ ]1
(26)
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In the case of m we have qm = (1 - a)m+1 fmkm ln [(1 - a) fk] - a. It helps to rewrite this.
Let y = (1 - a)m fmkm, then qm = (1 - a) y ln y1/m - a, i.e. qm = (1 - a)/
m[y ln y - (am)/(1 - a)]. This expression has to be evaluated at a solution to q(a) = 0.
At such a solution we have am = (1 - a)m+1 fmkm + (1 - a). Substituting this into the
expression for qm we get qm = (1 - a)/m [y ln y - y - 1], i.e. qm = (1 - a)/
m y [ln y - 1 - 1/y]. So qm () 0 as (1 - a)m fmkm () z. This final expression,
however, is just gA/gB when b = 0.
Proof of Theorem 5. The proof relies on analysing the behaviour of the inequalities in
condition 13 to examine which of the three types of equilibria we will get in the limit.
Then we examine the limiting behaviour of the appropriate equation (i.e. 9 or 12; 10











































So it is evident that the equilibrium ends up in one or the other corner. The conditions
in Theorem 3 then indicate what the equilibrium levels of a and b will be, since these
expressions do not involve p.





















































































m/p  k  1/(mp) we will have an interior solution regardless of the size of f. At an
interior equilibrium we obtain the limiting behaviour by examining equations 9 and
10. If k > 1/(mp) there will be some value f0 so that for f > f0 we will have
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, so we end up at a corner with B completely parasitic. At this
corner the value of a will be defined implicitly by equation 12, which can also be
written as
f k mm m m= +( ) −[ ] −( ) +α α1 1 1 1
As f → • the left hand side of this expression becomes unbounded. Equality can obtain
only if a → 1. Similarly we can show that if k < m/p we end up at the corner with A
parasitic as f → 0 and that at this corner we must have b → 1.
It is trivial to note that as k → • or k → 0 we have to be at the corner where B or A
are parasitic, respectively. The same logic used above then shows that a → 1 or b → 1 at
these corners.
It is also trivial to note that as m → 0 we must have an interior solution and that










































It follows that if k > 1/f we must end up in the corner with B parasitic as m → •, while
we end up in the opposite corner if k < 1/f. Consider the former case first. At this corner




































So the limiting value of a as m → • must be such that 1 - a = 1/(f k) and hence we
obtain a = 1 - 1/(f k). By a similar logic we show that b → 1 - f k as m → • if k < 1/f.
It remains to consider the case where k = 1/f. In this case it is possible to construct
cases where we have interior equilibria for all finite values of m (e.g. pick k = p = f = 1)
and where we have one or the other of the corner equilibria. Note, however, that in this
case
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1
1 1
and 1 - 1/(f k) = 1 - fk = 0 in this case also. It does not matter therefore what precise
series of equilibria the model traverses as m → •. In all cases a → 0 and b → 0.
Proof of Theorem 6. The proof of the first part follows from the proof of Proposition
A.8, i.e.YAB = c(pk + 1)W/(m + 1). In the case of a corner equilibrium where B is
completely parasitic we have YAB = cpakW. Consequently
I = − +( )1 1pk pkα (27)
hence
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂I p k pk pk pk p= − +( ) − +( )⋅ <α α1 1 02
∂ = − +( ) − +( )⋅ <I k p pk pk pk k∂ ∂ ∂α α1 1 02
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂I f pk pk f= − +( ) ≤1 0α
where we have also taken cognisance of the signs of the derivatives in Theorem 4. The
results for the other corner equilibrium follow analogously.
To establish what happens at the limit we use the results of Theorem 5. We first
observe which type of equilibrium we will end in, and then investigate the limit of I.
For instance we know that as k → • we end up with a corner equilibrium in which
B is completely parasitic. In this case I is given by equation 27 and limk→•
[1 - pka/(pk + 1)] = 0, since limk→• a = 1. The other results follow analogously.
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